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THE DILEMMA OF THE INTIMIDATED WITNESS IN
FEDERAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROSECUTIONS: CHOOSING
AMONG THE FEAR OF REPRISALS, THE CONTEMPT
POWERS OF THE COURT, AND THE WITNESS
PROTECTION PROGRAM
[Tihe revelations of Abe (Kid Twist) Reles kept public attention
focused on organized crime .... Information from Reles led to con-
victions in a half dozen previously unsolved gangland slayings ....
The career of informer Reles was cut short on November 12, 1941,
following his fatal plunge while in protective custody from a sixth-
story window at the Half Moon Hotel in Coney Island. The chief
beneficiary of his death, curiously enough, was Albert Anastasia; as
then Brooklyn District Attorney William O'Dwyer noted, a "perfect"
murder case against him "went out the window with Reles." The
debate over how Reles happened to fall with six policemen guarding
him raged on for years. For Valachi, however, it was not much of a
mystery. "I never met anybody," he says, "who thought Abe went out
that window because he wanted to. "
INTRODUCTION
Accounts of witnesses in criminal prosecutions meeting with violent
death are not restricted to sensational depictions in commercial publi-
cations.' For example, a United States Department of Justice Report
indicates that between 1974 and 1978 prosecution witnesses accounted
for nearly ten percent of all murders known to be attributable to
organized crime.2 Although witnesses in any criminal prosecution
* P. Maas, The Valachi Papers 180-81 (1969).
1. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 662 F.2d 946, 949 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 1978); LaTona v.
United States, 449 F.2d 121, 122 n.2 (8th Cir. 1971); Goldstock & Coenen, Control-
ling the Contemporary Loanshark: The Law of Illicit Lending and the Problem of
Witness Fear, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 127, 206-08 (1980); cf. Swanner v. United States,
406 F.2d 716, 717 (5th Cir. 1969)(witness's house bombed prior to grand jury
questioning despite government protection).
2. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of the Witness Security Program Review Com-
mittee 8 (Draft 1978), reprinted in Witness Protection Program: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 277 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Witness Protec-
tion Hearings]. "The following are typical recent cases involving murder of wit-
nesses, none of whom were in the Witness Security Program: Bompensiero, Frank:
Murdered February 22, 1977, while scheduled to appear before a Federal grand jury
in Los Angeles concerning extortion in the pornography business. Bowen, Harold:
Murdered February 22, 1977. It is believed that Bowen upset the organized crime
community when he testified before a Federal grand jury on a theft charge which
involved a member of a criminal organization. Delia, Ellen: Shot to death February
17, 1977, in Sacramento, California, where she had gone to give testimony concern-
ing fraud and misuse of Federal and state funds in the operation of East Los Angeles
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may experience fear, the level of intimidation rises dramatically in
organized crime prosecutions, especially those involving violence-re-
lated crimes such as loan-sharldng and extortion. 3
Public awareness of the potential danger to prospective witnesses,4
as well as specific threats against potential witnesses and their fami-
lies,s frequently account for the refusal of individuals to testify at
criminal proceedings. 6 Succumbing to this duress may have the ini-
tial effect of reducing or eliminating the prospective witness's fear of
reprisals, but it also places him in jeopardy of being held in civil 7 or
criminal contempt. 8
Community Projects. Delman, Gerald: Shot by an unknown assailant two days after
being subpoenaed and two weeks prior to scheduled testimony in a gambling case in
Las Vegas, Nevada. Ota, Stanley: Shot to death November 17, 1976 in a public
housing project . . . [following] widespread rumors that the crime syndicate had
ordered his death because of the possibility of his cooperation with government
authorities. Gretch, Anthony: Gunned down February 14, 1975. He had turned
state's evidence in a gangland killing of Louis Mariani in 1963. Giancana, Samuel:
Murdered in his Oak Park, Illinois home on June 19, 1975, prior to a federal grand
jury hearing. Rand, Tamara: Shot in the head November 9, 1975. Rand was a San
Diego realtor. After being cheated in several potentially lucrative real estate transac-
tions, Rand began compiling evidence for a judicial retaliation. Wellman, Alan E.
and his wife Renate: Murdered December 15, 1975, in their Sherman Oaks, Califor-
nia home. [Alan] Welman was scheduled to testify in a Federal court in Philadelphia
in January 1976. Dubeck, John and wife: Murdered in courtyard of their Las Vegas
apartment complex March 19, 1974. Dubeck was scheduled to testify the following
week against several organized crime figures. Fucillo, Joseph: Shot and killed Octo-
ber 17, 1974. Fucillo had testified against two major organized crime figures." Id. at
8-9, reprinted in 1978 Witness Protection Hearings, supra, at 277-78.
3. Goldstock & Coenen, supra note 1, at 207 & nn. 474-75.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 1978);
LaTona v. United States, 449 F.2d 121, 122 n.2 (8th Cir. 1971).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); People v. Clinton, 42 A.D.2d 815, 815, 346 N.Y.S.2d
345, 346 (1973).
6. See Invasions of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcoyn n. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. 3, at 1158 (1965) (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach) [hereinafter
cited as Invasions of Privacy]; Goldstock & Coenen, supra note 1, at 206-08.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976). Section 1826(a) provides that "'[w]henever a
witness in any proceeding before ... any court or grand jury of the United States
refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or
provide other information, . . . the court, upon such refusal .... may summarily
order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to
give such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall
exceed the life of-(1) the court proceeding, or (2) the term of the grand jury,
including extensions, before which such refusal to comply with the court order
occurred, but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months." Id. The
primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce the recalcitrant witness to testify. In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420, 423 (3d Cir. 1979). The contemnor may
purge himself of civil contempt at any time by agreeing to testify and, thus, holds
"the keys of [his] prison in [his] own pockets." In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir.
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Intimidated witnesses who refuse to testify often raise the defense of
duress as an excuse for their conduct.9 The rationale behind the
duress defense is that responsibility cannot be ascribed to a person
who commits a forbidden act under complusion.' 0 At common law,
1902). Civil contempt is distinguished from criminal contempt, see infra note 8, by
the purpose of the punishment imposed. "If it is for civil contempt the punishment is
remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt
the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court." Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). Section 401 empowers a federal court, at its discre-
tion, to punish by fine or imprisonment contempts of its authority, including "[d]is-
obedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."
Id. § 401(3). When a witness refuses to obey a lawful court order to testify before a
grand jury, he may be indicted for criminal contempt pursuant to § 401(3). See, e.g.,
United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United
States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1975). The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide for summary disposition of criminal contempts committed in the
presence of the court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a). Acts constituting criminal contempt
committed out of court require a hearing upon notice to the defendant. Id. 42(b).
The defendant is entitled to a jury trial "in any case in which an act of Congress so
provides." Id. Criminal contempt may be punished by imprisonment or fine, but not
both. In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1985); 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
Congress has left the length of imprisonment to the discretion of the courts, without
prescribing a maximum penalty. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969);
see 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). A court may not, however, impose a prison sentence in
excess of six months when the contemnor has not been given the option of a jury trial.
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 150 (1969). The purpose behind criminal
contempt proceedings is to vindicate the authority of the court by "punish[ing] acts
that are contumacious or disrespectful of the court." In re Grand Jury Investigation,
600 F.2d 420, 422-23 (3d Cir. 1979). Unlike civil contempt, the ability of the
contemnor to purge himself of contempt is entirely within the discretion of the court.
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1959), overruled on other grounds,
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965); United States v. De Simone, 267
F.2d 741, 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959). For a further discussion of
the distinctions between criminal and civil contempt, see 3 C. Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 704 (1969).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931
(1977); United States v. Cabrera, 440 F. Supp. 605, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd
mem., 578 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1978).
10. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1335 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (per cu-
riam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will
and the Criminal Law, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 313, 313 ('1957). This rationale is em-
bodied in the requirement that the duress be of sufficient force that a person of
ordinary firmness could not have resisted it. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 585
F.2d 1087, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 394 (1980);
United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431, 438 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976). The commentators disagree as to whether the compulsion must completely
strip the actor of his free will. Compare Newman & Weitzer, supra, at 313 (must
show compulsion deprived actor of his free will), with W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Criminal Law § 49, at 374 (1972) (crime justified by avoidance of greater harm
although actor has the mental state which the crime requires).
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duress is a defense to any crime except murder." Yet, the Supreme
Court has indicated in dictum that fear is not a legal excuse from
testifying.12 Perhaps as a result of this statement, no reported federal
decision exists wherein duress has been successfully utilized as a de-
fense to contempt of court.1 3
Without a duress defense, the intimidated witness must either tes-
tify and face potential reprisals by the accused, or not testify and face
the contempt powers of the court. The government has attempted to
11. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 10, at 374 (1972) (duress defense available
"unless [the] crime consists of intentionally killing an innocent third person"); e.g.,
R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st
Cir. 1949) ("It appears to be established... that although coercion or necessity will
never excuse taking the life of an innocent person, it will excuse lesser crimes.");
Thomas v. State, 246 Ga. 484, 486, 272 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1980) (-[the] common law
approach [is that] one should die himself before killing an innocent victim"). The
duress defense has been codified in thirty-two states. See 1979 Ala. Acts 1163; Alaska
Stat. § 11.81.440 (1980); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-412 (1978); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-
208 (1977); Cal. Penal Code § 26(seven) (Vest Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-
708 (1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-14 (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 431 (1981);
Ga. Code Ann. § 26-906 (1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-231 (1976 & Supp. 1980);
Idaho Code § 18-201(4) (1979); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 7-11 (Smith-Hurd 1972); Ind.
Code Ann. § 35-41-3-8 (Burns 1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 704.10 (West 1979); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 21-3209 (1974); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 501.090 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:18(6) (West 1974); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 103-A
(1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.08 (West 1964); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 562.071 (Vernon
1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-212 (1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 194.010(8) (1979); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-9 (West 1980); N.Y. Penal Law § 40.00 (McKinney 1975); N.D.
Cent. Code § 12.1-05-10 (1976); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.270 (1979); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 309 (Purdon 1973); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-5-1 (1979); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 8.05 (Vernon 1974); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1978); VWash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 9A.16.060 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.46 (West 1958). Twelve of
these thirty-two states give no indication that the defense cannot be used for murder.
See Alaska Stat. § 11.81.440 (1980); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-208 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-1-708 (1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-14 (1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-231
(1976 & Supp. 1980); Ind. Code Ann. § 3541-3-8 (Burns 1979); N.Y. Penal Law §
40.00 (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-10 (1976); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 309 (Purdon 1973); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-5-1 (1979); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 8.05 (Vernon 1974); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1978). An additional
two states provide that the duress defense can be used to reduce a charge of murder to
manslaughter. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-9(b) (West 1980); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.46(1)
(West 1958). For an analysis of the twenty statutes codifying the duress defense as of
1960, see Model Penal Code § 2.09 comment 1, at 2-4 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
12. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
13. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 611 F.2d 923, 925 (1st Cir. 1979) (defense not
recognized); United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 1978)
(defense not recognized); United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 386, 388 (7th Cir.
1976) (defense recognized, but denied on the facts), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931
(1977); Taylor v. United States, 509 F.2d 1349, 1350 (5th Cir. 1975) (defense not
recognized); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973) (defense not recog-
nized); United States v. Cabrera, 440 F. Supp. 605, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defense
recognized, but its benefit negated by the broad cross-examination permitted), aff'd
mem., 578 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1978).
1982]
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ameliorate this problem by creating the Witness Protection Pro-
gram.14 The purpose of the program is to protect government wit-
nesses and their families 15 by relocating the participants and provid-
ing them with new identities.' 6
Participation in the Witness Protection Program, however, requires
the witness to voluntarily relinquish his fundamental constitutional
rights of privacy and personal autonomy,' 7 freedom of association, 18
14. Witness Security Program: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Witness Security Hearings]. The Witness Protection
Program was created by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified, in part, in scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
Authorization for the Program is reprinted at 18 U.S.C. prec. § 3481 (1976).
15. 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 2. Entry into the program
is authorized by the Office of Enforcement Operations of the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice. Id. at 317. The Department requires that the testimony of
the witness be important to a case involving organized criminal activity, and that the
witness's life would be placed in jeopardy because of the testimony. Id.. Organized
crime is broadly defined for purposes of the Witness Protection Program and may
include, for example, cases involving public corruption or narcotics. See 1978 Wit-
ness Protection Hearings, supra note 2, at 84. "The program was designed originally
to combat organized crime. Over the years it became involved in white-collar crime,
political crime, State cases, and most importantly, the innocent victim of the crime."
1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 192. Responsibility for providing
"for the health, safety, and welfare of Government witnesses and their families" Is
entrusted to the United States Marshals Service. 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(c) (1980).
16. See 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 2. "The program
provides a variety of services to its participants, depending on each individual case.
These services include temporary protection, relocation, establishing a new identity,
providing documentation to support the new identity, and limited financial and
employment assistance." Id.
17. The Supreme Court has held that "the First Amendment has a penumbra
where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion." Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972). The
right to privacy consists of two interrelated strands. "One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-
600 (1977) (footnotes omitted). Justice Brandeis characterized "the right to be let
alone" as "the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion), overruled on other grounds, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); accord Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382
U.S. 406, 416 (1966). The very nature of the Witness Protection Program necessitates
substantial interference by the United States Marshals Service into the personal lives
of the participants. See 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 30, 86-87.
Restrictions are placed on the decision-making process regarding personal affairs. Id.
at 86-87. Perhaps the most obvious relinquishment of privacy and personal autonomy
is the requirement that all witnesses have a legal name change. Id. at 245; U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Justice Department Order OBD 2110.2: Witness Protection and Mainte-
nance Policy and Procedures (Jan. 10, 1975), reprinted in 1978 Witness Protection
Hearings, supra note 2, at 137.
18. Freedom of association is protected by the first amendment. Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507
(1964). The right may be abridged only to the extent that it is abused, such as by
THE INTIMIDATED WITNESS
freedom of travel 9 and liberty.20 Additionally, the effectiveness of
the program has come under attack.2' A 1980 inquiry by the United
States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations identified
numerous problems facing participants in the Witness Protection Pro-
gram.22 The principal problems uncovered include: false promises
made by law enforcement agents and prosecutors,2 breaches of the
assembling to incite violence or crime. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65
(1937). When the right is abridged the restrictions must not "sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). The
security needs of the Witness Protection Program require its participants to relinquish
their freedom of association despite the absence of its abuse. See 1980 Witness
Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 134. They are prohibited from associating with
anyone who could cause their identities to be revealed. This could well include
relatives and close friends. Id.
19. "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of law . . . . Freedom of movement is basic in our
scheme of values." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958); see Memorial Hosp.
v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969). For security pur-
poses, the Witness Protection Program restricts the movements of its participants. See
Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1980); 1980 Witness Security Hearings,
supra note 14, at 136. They cannot travel to any location where it is likely that they
will be recognized. Id.
20. Although the constitutional right of liberty has not been delimited, some of
its components have been defined. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
These include the right "to engage in any of the common occupations of life. . . and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. The ability of the participant in the
Witness Protection Program to engage in the common occupations of life is limited.
When, for example, a successful businessman is uprooted, he generally cannot rees-
tablish himself in a similar career because the program cannot provide the necessary
employment and credit background under the witness's new identity. See 1980
Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 29, 53, 108. This problem is exacerbated
by the program's lack of adequate employment assistance for relocated witnesses. Id.
at 7. The witness's pursuit of happiness is further hampered by the problems of forced
relocation and the shortcomings of the program in terms of assisting the witness in
reestablishing his life under a new identity. Id. at 18; see infra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text.
21. For a compilation of newspaper articles depicting shortcomings of the pro-
gram, see 1978 Witness Protection Hearings, supra note 2, at 155-61, 165-69, 179-80
(discussing alleged mob payoffs for information concerning the locations of protected
witnesses, the disappearance of files on protected witnesses, and allegations that the
government casts aside protected witnesses once they are no longer useful).
22. 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 7.
23. Id. at 7, 64, 66. All promises made to a witness are recorded in a written
memorandum of understanding. See 1978 Witness Protection Hearings, supra note 2,
at 230-51. The document, however, is not considered to be binding. See 1980 Witness
Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 7. The courts have found that the), do not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of disgruntled participants in the program,
see, e.g., Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1980); McFarland v. United
1982]
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witness's security,2 4 late and ineffectual documentation of the wit-
ness's new identity, 25 inadequate employment assistance, 20 failure to
provide adequate financing or credit, 27 insensitivity to the witness's
trauma and problems, 2 and lack of an effective procedure for filing
complaints about the program.2 9
Thus, the dilemma of the intimidated witness consists of a choice
among three unappealing alternatives. One option is to testify without
protection and take the chance that the threatened reprisals will not
be carried out.30 Alternatively, the witness may choose to participate
in the Witness Protection Program despite its shortcomings3' and the
attendant relinquishment of fundamental constitutional rights. 32  Fi-
nally, he may refuse to testify and face the contempt powers of the
court without the benefit of the duress defense. 33
The dilemma is especially onerous for the prospective witness who
has no involvement with criminal activity, such as the innocent by-
stander, the victim, or those only tangentially involved with criminal
syndicates. This type of witness, which will be referred to in this Note
as the innocent witness, should be distinguished from the witness who
has brought the dilemma upon himself by virtue of his voluntary
association with an organized criminal subculture.3 4 In the case of
the innocent witness, the dilemma is exacerbated by the inability of
the Witness Protection Program to address the needs of honest, law-
abiding citizens.3 5 The program simply was not structured for wit-
States, No. 45-81C (Ct. Cl. July 28, 1981) (order available on Lexis, Genfed library,
Ct. Cl. file); Moon v. United States, No. 682-80C, (Ct. Cl. May 22, 1981) (order
available on Lexis, Genfed library, Ct. Cl. file), and that they do'not have the power
to order specific performance by the United States of its contractual obligations. See,
e.g., Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 1980); Moon v. United States, No.
682-80C (Ct. Cl. May 22, 1981) (order available on Lexis, Genfed library, Ct. Cl.
file).
24. 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 7, 26-27.
25. Id. at 7, 17, 66-67, 89.
26. Id. at 7, 67-68.
27. Id. at 7, 17, 66-67.
28. Id. at 7, 69, 93.
29. Id. at 7, 23.
30. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 611 F.2d 923, 925 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. United States, 509 F.2d
1349, 1350 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973). The
refusal of a witness to testify should generally go a long way toward ensuring that he
will not be the victim of reprisals. There can be no guarantees, however, that he will
not be perceived by organized crime as a continuing threat because of the incriminat-
ing information he possesses.
34. See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 255 (statement of
Howard Safir, Assistant Director for Operations, U.S. Marshals Service). "When [the
program] was originally constructed it was designed primarily for those people who
588 [Vol. 50
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nesses not directly involved in criminal activity. 3 Indeed, Congress
apparently did not contemplate the possibility that an innocent wit-
ness could be compelled, by the contempt powers of a court, to testify
in the face of overriding fear..37
This Note contends that the innocent witness in federal organized
crime prosecutions should be permitted to utilize the duress defense
against charges of contempt for refusal to testify,38 regardless of
whether the witness has rejected an opportunity to participate in the
Witness Protection Program. 39 The universal disfavor of the defense
in the federal courts emanates from an excessive and undue reliance40
were involved in criminal activity and it is not structured for noncriminal people.
•.. [W]e cannot make a person whole again.... [A]ny private citizen who would
come into this program . . . would find considerable trauma because we cannot
replace his house, we cannot replace his car, we cannot replace his credit back-
ground. Those are the things that the program does not have the capability to do."
Id.
36. Id.
37. See 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 255 (statement of Sen.
Nunn). Senator Nunn stated that the Witness Protection Program was not the only
alternative for the cooperating citizen who inadvertently had come upon incriminat-
ing information against organized crime. He indicated that "[t]hey can do nothing.
They do not have to cooperate at all. They can continue to overlook the criminal
activity that they could otherwise testify to." Id.
38. Although the duress defense is generally thought of as a defense to crimes, see
supra note 11 and accompanying text, the defense should be available for civil, as
well as criminal contempt. Cf. United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir.
1979) (finding it unnecessary to determine whether duress applies to a civil contempt
charge). In the civil context, proof that the elements of the defense are present should
constitute a showing that the refusal to testify was not "without just cause," as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976). See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying
text. The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is not always clearly
demarcated and their purposes often overlap. See Compers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911); supra notes 7-8. "'Common sense would recognize
that conduct can amount to both civil and criminal contempt. The same acts may
justify a court in resorting to coercive and to punitive measures." United States v.
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947) (footnote omitted). In the federal
courts, a refusal to obey a court order to testify can result in civil or criminal
contempt interchangeably. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)
(1976). Moreover, permitting the duress defense only for criminal contempt would
create an anomolous situation. If this were to occur, a court could simply resort to
the use of civil contempt to punish a witness when the criminal contempt alternative
was removed by the duress defense. This would clearly be unconscionable.
39. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit has held
that even if the defense were available, it could not be utilized by a defendant who
had turned down an offer of government protection. United States v. Gravel, 605
F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1979).
40. See In re Farrell, 611 F.2d 923, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 1978); Dupuy v. United States, 518 F.2d
1295, 1295 (9th Cir. 1975); Taylor v. United States, 509 F.2d 1349, 1350 (5th Cir.
1975); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973); LaTona v. United States,
449 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1971). The Seventh Circuit has allowed the defense, but
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on mere dictum in a 1961 Supreme Court decision. 41 The counter-
balancing considerations posed by the dilemma of the innocent wit-
ness necessitates a reevaluation of the heretofore categorical denial of
the duress defense.42
It is further contended that forcing an individual to choose between
the relinquishment of constitutional rights attendant to participation
in the Witness Protection Program, or facing possible incarceration
for contempt stripped of the duress defense, imposes an unconstitu-
tional burden on the witness's prerogative to retain those fundamental
rights that he does not voluntarily choose to relinquish. The Note
concludes with a discussion of procedural problems that would be
generated by the allowance of the duress defense for contempt. It
suggests that these problems could be eliminated through the use of in
camera hearings that would be recorded with the transcript sealed.
Such proceedings would permit the witness to account for his recalci-
trance in an atmosphere of confidentiality.
I. THE DuREss DEFENSE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Congress has not expressly addressed the availability of affirmative
defenses, such as the duress defense, in federal criminal statutes. 41
Consequently, the federal judiciary has inherited the task of determin-
ing the law in this area.44
A. The Elements of the Defense
The classic formulation of the duress defense in federal criminal
proceedings is contained in a 1935 decision, Shannon v. United
States: 45
strictly construed its elements, thus limiting its usefulness. United States v. Patrick,
542 F.2d 381, 386-88 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977). Decisions In
the Second Circuit are unclear on the availability of the defense. Compare United
States v. Cabrera, 440 F. Supp. 605, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (allowing the defense, but
permitting cross-examination that severely limited its usefulness), aff'd meem., 578
F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1978), with United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir.
1973) (dictum repeating, with apparent approval, an unreported lower court state-
ment that fear was not a legal excuse for refusing to testify).
41. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
42. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 74 n.6 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
(criticizing mechanical application of the rule that the public has a right to every
man's evidence); see Gibb v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 180, 188 (Iowa 1979) (employing
a balancing test); cf. Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 908 (8th Cir.) (criticizing
the harshness of the Piemonte decision), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975).
43. Comment, The Constitutionality of Criminal Affirmative Defenses: Duress
and Coercion, 11 U.S.F. L. Rev. 123, 154-55 (1976).
44. Id. at 155.
45. 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935). See generally 1 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar,
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 14.16 (3rd ed. 1977) (standard jury instruc-
tion on duress utilizing elements of Shannon).
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Coercion which will excuse the commission of a criminal act must
be immediate and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done.
One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without danger of
that kind cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion .... 46
Thus, the requirements of the duress defense in the federal courts are:
1) the threat must be of death or serious bodily harm; 47
2) the threat must be such that a person of ordinary firmness
would have been unable to resist it; 41
3) there must have been no reasonable, legal alternative to suc-
cumbing to the duress; 49 and
4) the threat must be of immediate harm.50
The elements of the duress defense have been applied in varying
form.51 A controversy has centered around the immediacy require-
ment, which has received inconsistent treatment by courts52 and legis-
latures,5 3 and editorial attack by commentators. 4
46. 76 F.2d at 493. The terms duress and coercion are occasionally used inter-
changeably. United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 569 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977); see,
e.g., United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 918 (1980); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1335 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). The common law, however, makes
a distinction between the defenses of duress and necessity. United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 409 (1980). The duress defense applies when threats of harm are
received from other human beings. Id. at 409-10. The defense of necessity is invoked
when the forces of nature render an otherwise illegal course of conduct the lesser of
two evils. Id. at 410. Nonetheless, modern cases have tended to blur the common-law
distinction between the tvo defenses. Id.
47. E.g., United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980); United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976). The term serious bodily harm has not been
defined. Generally, the question whether the threatened harm is sufficiently serious
must be answered in relation to the second requirement of the duress defense. See
cases cited infra note 48.
48. United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rcud on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); see United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431, 438 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
49. E.g., United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1977).
50. E.g., United States v. Atencio, 586 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931
(1977).
51. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.09 comments 1-2 (Tent. Draft No. 10,1960);
W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 10, § 49, at 374-79; Newman & Weitzer, supra
note 10, at 319-26.
52. Compare United States v. Atencio, 586 F.2d 744, 745-47 (9th Cir. 1978)
(immediacy of danger not sufficiently shown where defendant had been shot at and
there was a contract out on his life), and United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388
(7th Cir. 1976) (defendant failed to show the requisite immediacy despite demon-
strating a reasonable apprehension of injury), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977), and
People v. Lo Cicero, 71 Cal. 2d 1186, 1190, 80 Cal. Rptr. 913, 916, 459 P.2d 241,
244 (1969) (en bane) (imminent violence is essential to the duress defense), with Hall
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The policy behind the immediacy requirement is that one must take
advantage of any opportunity to escape or seek police assistance
against the threatenedharm.- s Thus, to be immediate, the perceived
danger must be unavoidable and presently threatened;50 threats of
future harm are insufficient.5 7 This strict interpretation of the imme-
diacy requirement has been criticized as illogical:
To say that a threat of future harm is not sufficient is to ignore the
fact that the nature of a threat is to hold out a future harm. All
danger to the "duressed" is in the future, for if it were in the
present it would no longer be a danger or a threat but would be an
accomplished harm.58
In line with this reasoning, one state court has implicitly held that a
perjurer could be excused if at the time of her false testimony she
believed that there was impending danger to her life, regardless of
whether it was actually imminent or not.59 In another perjury case,
an English court widened the ambit of the duress defense by holding
Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 684, 187 So. 392, 409 (1939) (duress was sufficiently
immediate if the defendant believed there was impending danger to her life), and
People v. Unger, 33 111. App. 3d 770, 775, 338 N.E.2d 442, 446 (1975) ("gun to the
head immediacy" is not required), aff'd, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977), and
R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244, 246-47 (Grim. App.) (threat of future harm Is
sufficient so long as it is effective on the mind of the defendant at the time of the
offense).
53. Nineteen of the thirty-two states that have codified the duress defense have
expressly incorporated an immediacy requirement. 1979 Ala. Acts 1163; Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-412(A) (1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-14 (1981); Ca. Code Ann. §
26-906 (1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 7-11(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 35-41-3-8(a) (Burns 1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 704.10 (West 1979); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3209(1) (1974); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:18(6) (West 1974); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 17A, § 103-A(1) (1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.08 (West 1964); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
562.071(1) (Vernon 1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-212 (1981); N.Y. Penal Law §
40.00(2) (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-10(1) (1976); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 8.05(a) (Vernon 1974); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (1978); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.16.060(1)(a) (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.46(1) (West 1958).
Two of the states only require immediacy for felonies. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-3-8(a)
(Burns 1979); N.D. Gent. Code § 12.1-05-10(1) (1976).
54. Model Penal Code § 2.09 comment 2, at 7-8 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960);
Newman & Weitzer, supra note 10, at 328.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1979) (duress
defense not available when defendant had turned down an offer of government
protection); Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935) (denying
defense because "appellants had full opportunity to cease their participation in the
offense and if necessary seek protection from the officers of the law").
56. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 16 Ill. App. 3d 846, 848, 306 N.E.2d 897, 898
(1974) ("A threat of future injury is not enough to excuse a criminal act."); State v.
Milum, 213 Kan. 581, 582, 516 P.2d 984, 985 (1973) (similar language).
58. Newman & Weitzer, supra note 10, at 328.
59. Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 684, 187 So. 392, 409 (1939); id. at 689, 187 So.
at 411 (Buford, J., dissenting); Newman & Weitzer, supra note 10, at 320.
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that a threat of future harm is sufficient so long as it is effective on the
mind of the defendant at the time of the offense. 60 In fact, a number
of states,61 as well as the Model Penal Code,6 2 have completely elimi-
nated the immediacy requirement from their definition of duress.
Nonetheless, the requirement remains intact in the federal courts.6 3
When the defendant has otherwise met the elements of the duress
defense, he may still be prevented from utilizing it. A common-law
rule precludes the use of the defense by an individual who negligently,
recklessly or intentionally places himself in a situation where it is
probable that he will be subject to duress to commit an illegal act. 4
For example, an individual who joins a criminal subculture and takes
a vow of silence has willfully placed himself in a situation where it is
probable, if called upon as a witness, that he will be under duress to
commit the offense of contempt when ordered by a judge to break his
60. R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244, 246-47 (Crim. App.) (threats are "likely
to be no less compelling, because their execution could not be effected in the court
room, if they could be carried out in the streets.. the same night").
61. See 1979 Ala. Acts 1163; Alaska Stat. § 11.81.440 (1980); Ark. Stat. Ann. §
41-208 (1977); Cal. Penal Code § 26(seven) (West Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
1-708 (1978); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 431 (1974); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-231
(1976 & Supp. 1980); Idaho Code § 18-201(4) (1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 501.090
(Bobbs-Merrill 1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 194.010(8) (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-9
(West 1980); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.270 (1979); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 309 (Purdon
1973); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-5-1 (1979).
62. Model Penal Code § 2.09 (1962).
63. E.g., United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980); United States v. Atencio, 586 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1335 n.I (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
64. People v. Rodriquez, 30 Ill. App. 3d 118, 120, 332 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1975);
State v. McKinney, 19 Wash. App. 23, 25, 573 P.2d 820, 821 (1978); W. LaFave &
A. Scott, supra note 10, § 49, at 376; Newman & Weitzer, supra note 10, at 321.
"The defense [of duress] is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a
situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense
is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, when-
ever negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged." Model Penal
Code § 2.09(2) (1962). Of the thirty-two states that have codified the duress defense,
twenty-one have incorporated this common-law exception. See 1979 Ala. Acts 1163;
Alaska Stat. § 11.81.440(b) (1980); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13.412(B) (1978); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 41-208(2) (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-708 (1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. §
53a-14 (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 431(b) (1979); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-
231(2) (1976 & Supp. 1980); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-3-8(b)(1) (Burns 1979); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 21-3209(2) (1974); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 501.090(2) (Bobbs-Merrill
1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 103-A(3)(B) (1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
562.071(2)(2) (Vernon 1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-9(b) (West 1980); N.Y. Penal
Law § 40.00(2) (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-10(2) (1976); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 161.270(2) (1979); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 309(b) (Purdon 1973); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 8.05(d) (Vernon 1974); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(2) (1978);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.16.060(3) (1977).
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vow. 65  When such evidence is brought to light, the rule would
preclude utilization of the duress defense. This common-law exception
has been explicitly recognized by at least one federal court. 0 Clearly,
the defense should not be available when evidence indicates that the
defendant has conducted himself in such a manner.
B. The Availability of the Duress Defense for Contempt
The duress defense has been considered available for the following
federal offenses: treason,6 7 bank robbery, 8 misappropriation of bank
funds, 9 various narcotics related offenses, 70 prison escape, 7' unlawful
possession of firearms, 72 forgery of military passes, 73 perjury, 4 sale of
stolen goods, 75 and failure to appear for trial. 76  The defense has never
65. Members of organized criminal subcultures adhere to a compulsory code of
silence, known as "omerta" in Sicilian crime families, that precludes them, at the risk
of death, from informing or testifying against their fellow criminals. See 1 L.
Radzinowitz & M. Wolfgang, Crime and Justice: The Criminal in Society 335-36
(1971); E. Reid, Mafia 40-47 (1952). "A form of compulsory omerta is inflicted upon
people who have become involved with criminals through greed and are forced into
compromises and arrangements. The ... principle is simply this: 'Talk, and you die!
Keep your mouth shut and we will take care of you and your familyl' "Id. at 41. The
code of silence is present in all organized criminal subcultures. "It is the universal
code of the underworld, the inner government of the outlaw-whether he be crimi-
nal, patriotic, revolutionary or delinquent." G. Tyler, Organized Crime in America
332 (1967).
66. United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979); cf. In re Certain
Proceedings Before 1959 Grand Jury, 212 F. Supp. 823, 826-27 (N.D. I11. 1963)
(court rejected fear as a mitigating factor when the defendant had been the cause of
his own plight).
67. E.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 735 (1952); United States v.
Vigol, 2 U.S. 301, 302, 2 Dall. 346, 347 (1795); Respublica v. McCarty, 2 U.S. 75,
76, 2 Dall. 86, 87-88 (1781); D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 357-59 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952).
68. E.g., United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir.
1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
69. United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143, 146-47 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 950 (1973).
70. E.g., United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 43L, 438 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 835 (1976); United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1975).
71. E.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415 n.11 (1980); United States v.
Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1977).
72. United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979).
73. United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 812-13 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973).
74. E.g., United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 626-27 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
911 (1976).
75. United States v. Saettele, 585 F.2d 307, 309 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 910 (1979).
76. United States v. Atencio, 586 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1978).
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been successfully utilized, however, in any reported decision regard-
ing contempt of court for a refusal to testify. Of the eight circuits that
have addressed the issue, six have explicitly held the defense to be
unavailable as a matter of law;" one has given conflicting signals as to
the availability of the defense;7 8 and one has clearly indicated that the
defense is available, but denied it on the facts of the case.79
The primary source of authority for cases denying or severely re-
stricting the defense has been the 1961 Supreme Court decision in
Piemonte v. United States.8 ° In Piemonte, the petitioner challenged
his conviction for contempt emanating from a refusal to testify. Al-
though under a grant of immunity, Piemonte refused to answer ques-
tions posed to him by a grand jury on the ground that the answers
would tend to incriminate him. 8' The district court entered an order
directing Piemonte to show cause why he should not be held in
criminal contempt. 82  At the subsequent hearing, the only reason
Piemonte offered for refusing to testify was fear for his own safety and
that of his wife and children.8 3 The district judge rejected this excuse
and sentenced Piemonte to eighteen months for criminal contempt.,
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court,
holding that fear of underworld retaliation could not excuse a witness
from his obligation to testify.85
In the Supreme Court, Piemonte sought reversal of his contempt
conviction on the grounds that the order directing him to testify
lacked sufficient clarity 6 and that the grant of immunity issued by the
77. In re Farrell, 611 F.2d 923, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 1978); Dupuy v. United States, 518 F.2d
1295, 1295 (9th Cir. 1975); Taylor v. United States, 509 F.2d 1349, 1350 (5th Cir.
1975); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973); LaTona v. United States,
449 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1971).
78. Compare United States v. Cabrera, 440 F. Supp. 605, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (allowing the defense, but permitting cross-examination severely limiting its
usefulness), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1978), with United States v.
Handler, 476 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1973) (dictum repeating, with apparent ap-
proval, an unreported lower court statement that fear was not a legal excuse for
refusing to testify).
79. United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 386-88 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 931 (1977).
80. 367 U.S. 556 (1961).
81. In re Certain Proceedings Before 1959 Grand Jury, 212 F. Supp. 823, 824(N.D. M. 1963).
82. Id. at 825.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Piemonte v. United States, 276 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1960), affd on other
grounds, 367 U.S. 556 (1961). Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit stands alone today
in its clear position that the duress defense can be utilized for such a refusal to testify,
provided sufficient evidence is introduced to support the defense. United States v.
Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
86. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 560 (1961).
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district judge was null and void.8 7 He did not urge the duress defense
as a ground for reversal .88 Justice Frankfurter, however, addressed
the issue in dictum, which, in a footnote to the majority opinion,
asserted that fear was not a valid excuse from testifying. 9
Justice Frankfurter compared Piemonte to the innocent witness by
indicating that "fear of reprisal offers an immunized prisoner no more
dispensation from testifying than it does any innocent bystander with-
out a record."'9 0 Piemonte, however, should be distinguished from
the case of an innocent witness who can meet the requirements of the
duress defense. Armando Piemonte was not an innocent witness. He
was serving a six-year sentence for the sale and possession of heroin,
and he was called to testify before a grand jury inquiring into narcot-
ics offenses."' Moreover, it is not likely that Justice Frankfurter in-
tended to deny categorically the future utilization of the duress de-
fense for all classes of witnesses without examination of counter-
balancing considerations.9 2
At the core of the Piemonte dictum is the concept that every citizen
has a duty to give testimony and to aid in the enforcement of the
law.9 3 The Court bolstered its reasoning with a citation to
Wigmore94 and a restatement of the ancient phrase: "[T]he public
has a right to every man's evidence." 95 A further reading of
Wigmore, however, reveals a distaste for the mechanical application
of this rule.9 6 Wigmore decries as unjustifiable a state case affirming
the contempt conviction of a woman who refused to testify because of
death threats against her and her family. 7 His dissatisfaction with
the decision stemmed from the fact that it paid "no attention at all to
the question whether a witness so threatened is entitled to some
protection, or at least to some consideration, before compelling testi-
mony."' 98 Nonetheless, the federal courts have generally applied the
87. Id. at 561.
88. Id. at 559 n.2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 556.
92. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), decided the same year as Piemnonte,
Justice Frankfurter joined in the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan that objected
vigorously to the Court's ruling on an issue, which although raised, was subordinate
to the pivotal issue of the case. 367 U.S. at 672-73. The issue was "briefed not at all
and argued only extremely tangentially." Id. at 676. Of course, in Piemonte, the
availability of the duress defense was neither raised, briefed nor argued. Piemonte v.
United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
93. 367 U.S. at 559 n.2.
94. Id. at 559 n.2 (citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940)).
95. Id.
96. See 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 42, § 2192, at 74 n.6.




policy of the Piemonte footnote dictum in a mechanical fashion,
without discussing the countervailing considerations posed by the in-
nocent witness. 99
It would appear, however, that some federal courts may be retreat-
ing from the use of the Piemonte dictum as an absolute bar to the
duress defense for contempt. In United States v. Patrick,'00 the Sev-
enth Circuit recognized the availability of the defense for con-
tempt.10' The court, however, denied the defense on the facts of the
case 02 and appeared to be extending itself to reach a result in line
with the policy of Piemonte.
In Patrick, the witness's fear was prompted by several visits to his
home by the defendant. During these visits, the defendant made
various threats to Patrick's daughter such as "there is going to be a lot
of heartache for all of you," and "[e]ither I see your father before my
case goes to trial or you are all going to suffer."' 03  In addition, the
defendant had made visits to the home of Patrick's ex-wife, daughter
and aunts, where he also made threats.' 0 4 Further, Patrick presented
evidence that the defendant had a reputation for being a dangerous
killer. 0 5 Despite this testimony, the court stated that he could not be
excused from testifying "based on [these] few vague threats of re-
prisal." 106
In United States v. Cabrera,'07 a district court in the Second Circuit
allowed the defense, but simultaneously refused to limit cross-exami-
nation of the defendant.' 08 Thus, if Cabrera took the stand to assert
his defense, the government would have been permitted to cross-ex-
amine him concerning the murder he witnessed. The basis for allow-
99. E.g., In re Farrell, 611 F.2d 923, 92-5 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. United States, 509 F.2d
1349, 1350 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973).
100. 542 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
101. Id. at 386.
102. Id. at 388.
103. Id. at 387.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 387 n.7.
106. Id. at 388. A careful defendant is likely to frame threats made to witnesses in
vague terms to reduce the likelihood of being convicted of tampering with a witness,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976). For example, in United States v. Mas-
trangelo, 662 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981), the defendant cautioned a government witness
against identifying him before the grand jury. Id. at 948-49. The defendant's warn-
ing contained phrases such as: " 'You know what I mean Jim it's for your own
good' "; " 'So let's do it the right way' "; and" 'that's it, case closed.' " Id. at 949.
Although the defendant's words did not contain an explicit threat, he was indicted
for "knowingly and corruptly endeavoring to influence the due administration of
justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1503." Id. at 947 (footnote omitted). While on his way to the
courthouse to testify against the defendant, the threatened witness was shot to death.
Id. at 949.
107. 440 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a3f'd inere., 578 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1978).
108. Id. at 606-07.
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ing this cross-examination was the theory that Cabrera's presence or
absence at the scene of the murder was "clearly material to the truth
or falsity of claims that threats had been made to Cabrera, as well as
to the reasonableness of his fear of injury." 10 Although admitting
that it had placed the defendant in a "Catch 22" situation, 110 the court
pointed to the policy of Piemonte as a justification."'
A recent decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 12 evidences
a possible softening in its established line of holdings that fear for
personal and family safety is not a defense to contempt of court. 1 3
After stating that "[i]t [was] not necessary that we decide whether
duress can never be invoked in a contempt case," 114 the court went on
to deny the defense because the defendant had turned down an offer
of government protection." 5
The state courts have similarly exhibited a general reluctance to
allow the duress defense for contempt of court."" The policy behind
their decisions has been in conformity with Piemonte,17 and at least
one state court has cited Piemonte and its progeny in the federal
courts." 8 The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, has refused to
foreclose the possibility of successful utilization of the defense for
refusal to testify." 9 This court has adopted a balancing test, "weigh-
109. Id. at 606.
110. Id.
111. The viability of the duress defense for contempt in the Second Circuit Is
clouded by its decision in United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1973). In
Handler, the circuit court implicitly approved the district judge's rejection of fear as
a legal excuse from testifying, although the issue was not presented on appeal. Id. at
712.
112. United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1979).
113. United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 780 (5th Cir. 1975); Taylor v. United States,
509 F.2d 1349, 1350 (5th Cir. 1975) (adopting the reasoning of LaTona v. United
States, 449 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1971)).
114. United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1979).
115. Id. at 752. The court rejected the defendant's contention that the protection
would be "ineffective." Id. Their lack of compassion was prompted by society's
powerful interest in a witness's knowledge of a matter under investigation. Id. (citing
Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961)).
116. E.g., State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. 55, 57-58, 579 P.2d 559, 561-62 (1978) (on
banc); People v. Carradine, 52 Ill. 2d 231, 234, 287 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1972); State v.
Sanchez, 89 N.M. 673, 677, 556 P.2d 359, 363 (1976); People v. Clinton, 42 A.D.2d
815, 815, 346 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (1973).
117. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. 55, 57-58, 579 P.2d 559, 561-62 (1978)
(en banc) (dangerous conditions for government witnesses in prison do not change the
law of contempt); People v. Carradine, 52 Ill. 2d 231, 234, 287 N.E.2d 670, 672
(1972) (crime will not be rooted out unless citizens who witness it cooperate before
the bar of justice); People v. Clinton, 42 A.D.2d 815, 815, 346 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346
(1973) ("every person owes a duty to the State to testify and may be compelled to do
so").
118. Gibb v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 180, 187-88 (Iowa 1979).
119. Id. at 188.
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ing the likelihood and magnitude of reprisal against the actual need
for the evidence at trial." 120
The emergence of this balancing test, and the recent federal cases
that have refrained from interpreting Piemonte as an absolute bar to
the defense, provide a positive signal that the courts may be integrat-
ing the harsh realities of "life in the streets" with their application of
judicial precedents. Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did
just that in a case involving a notorious organization of narcotics
distributors. 2 1  On the eve of the trial, a potential witness had been
murdered.'22 A threat also was reportedly made against the life of
another witness in protective custody. 2 3 Concerned for the safety of
the jurors, the trial judge ordered that their identities remain anony-
mous. 2 4 The decision was upheld as comporting with the judge's
obligation to protect the jury.12 5 In recognizing the grave responsibil-
ities of the trial judge, the court noted that "[a]ppeUate judges, from
the comparative security of their ivory towers, are not burdened...
with the responsibility of providing for the protection of the jurors,
witnesses, and counsel." 2 6
II. EXTENDING THE DuREss DEFENSE TO THE INNOCENT WITNESS
As part of a statutory scheme to eradicate criminal syndicates,
Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.127 In
recognition of the problem of recalcitrant witnesses in organized
crime prosecutions, Congress included section 1826(a) of Title 28 of
the United States Code,ls which provides civil contempt penalties for
witnesses who refuse to testify. 29 Incarceration for contempt may
120. Id. The balancing test adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court is preferable to
the categorical denial of the duress defense. If used in the federal courts, however,
witnesses could still be coerced to relinquish their constitutional rights through
participation in the Witness Protection Program. This would occur when the "likeli-
hood and magnitude of reprisal" was outweighed by "the actual need for the evi-
dence at trial." Id. Such a finding would occur with disturbing frequency if the
federal courts were to follow the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in In re Michaelson,
511 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). In Michaelson, the
court stated that "the discomfort any witness has in testifying against his wishes
about matters within his knowledge, cannot outweigh the court's interest in getting
the facts necessary to make a reasoned and informed decision." Id. (emphasis in
original).
121. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
907 (1980).
122. Id. at 137 n.7.
123. Id. at 136.
124. Id. at 133.
125. Id. at 141.
126. Id. at 137.
127. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified. in part, in scattered
sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).




not exceed the life of the court proceeding or the term of the grand
jury, including extensions. 130 In no event, however, may the period
of confinement exceed eighteen months. 131
In enacting this statute, Congress did not address the availability of
the duress defense, either in the statute132 or its legislative history. 33
The drafters did provide, however, that a refusal to testify would only
constitute contempt when it was "without just cause."1 34 A reason-
able construction of the statute is that defenses recognized at common
law could constitute "just cause" for refusal to testify. Inasmuch as the
duress defense has long been recognized for serious criminal offenses
other than murder, 35 it should logically qualify as just cause for a
refusal to testify. Such a construction would comport with the ancient
and oft-repeated rule of statutory construction that requires penal
statutes to be strictly construed against the government and in favor of




133. See H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Organized Crime Control: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on S.30, and Related Proposals, Relating to the
Control of Organized Crime in the United States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [herein-
after cited as 1970 Organized Crime Hearings].
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976).
135. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
136. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 35, 44, 5 Wheat. 76, 93 (1820) ("The
rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than
construction itself."); see United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); Rewls
v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83
(1955); 3 C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 59.03, at 6-7
(4th ed. 1974). Section 1826(a) should be construed as a penal statute. Generally,
when the primary purpose of a statute is enforced by a fine or imprisonment, it is
construed as penal. Id. § 59.01, at 1. In determining whether a statute is penal or
nonpenal, courts look to its purpose. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958). "If the
statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.-it has been considered penal." Id. (footnote omit-
ted). Although the technical purpose of a civil contempt statute is to coerce testi-
mony, and not to punish, the purposes of civil and criminal contempt tend to
overlap. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1911). A
refusal to obey a federal court order to testify can result in civil or criminal contempt
interchangeably. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976). The federal
courts have considered the availability of the duress defense for refusal to testify
without discussing whether the witness had been cited for civil or criminal contempt.
E.g., In re Farrell, 611 F.2d 923, 925 (1st Cir. 1979) (civil contempt); United States
v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (6th Cir. 1978)(criminal contempt). The crimi-
nal overtones of civil contempt are further illustrated by the practice, in a number of
federal circuits, of conducting civil contempt proceedings in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b) for criminal contempt. E.g., In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420, 423 n.7 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Sadin, 509
F.2d 1252, 1255 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1023 (9th Cir.
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For example, the Supreme Court has declined to abrogate the com-
mon-law requirement of criminal intent for the theft of government
property on the ground that "[s]uch a manifest impairment of the
immunities of the individual should not be extended to common-law
crimes on judicial initiative." 3 7 This reluctance was grounded in the
belief that individuals should not be deprived of common-law immu-
nities or defenses in the absence of express congressional intent to that
effect.138  Contempt of court is clearly a common-law offense, and
the legislative history of section 1826(a) reflects no intent to create a
new, statutory offense immune from the defenses traditionally avail-
able at common law. 39
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently addressed the avail-
ability of the duress defense for federal statutory offenses."10 The
Court acknowledged the availability of the defense for federal prison
escapes,14' although it denied it on the facts. 42  In construing the
applicable statute, 143 Justice Rehnquist noted that "Congress in enact-
ing criminal statutes legislates against a background of Anglo-Saxon
common law .. .and that therefore a defense of duress or coercion
may well have been contemplated." 4  This line of reasoning applies
equally well to the federal statutes prescribing penalties for contempt
of court.
Moreover, it appears that section 1826(a) was never intended to
apply to the innocent witness who refuses to testify against members
of criminal syndicates due to fear of reprisals. On the contrary, the
legislative history reveals that this section was "framed with an eye
toward coercing members of secret syndicates to disobey their vows of
silence and to cooperate in grand jury investigations." 145 Thus, appli-
cation of section 1826(a) to the innocent witness without the benefit of
the duress defense would exceed the coercive powers extended by
Congress to the courts.
Courts that have categorically denied the availability of the duress
defense for contempt may have been motivated by a reluctance to
1973). Furthermore, in determining whether a statute is penal, the courts must look
to the severity of the penalty it imposes, in addition to its purpose. Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 96 n.18 (1958). Under § 1826(a), the civil contemnor may be incarcer-
ated for as long as eighteen months. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976).
137. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
138. Id.
139. H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970) ("Title III is intended to
codify present civil contempt practice with respect to recalcitrant witnesses in Fed-
eral grand jury and court proceedings.").
140. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
141. Id. at 415 n.11.
142. Id. at 415.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1976).
144. 444 U.S. at 415 n.11 (footnote omitted).
145. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1979); see 1970
Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 133, at 99-100 (statement of Sen. McClellan).
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compromise the effectiveness of the fight against organized crime.
Any such fear would be generally unjustified. The fight against orga-
nized crime can proceed apace without the power to coerce the testi-
mony of the intimidated, innocent witness. The witnesses that are
essential to the prosecution of organized crime are often heavily in-
volved in crime and are frequently targets of the investigation or
codefendants in the case at trial.146 Their voluntary association with
an organized criminal subculture places them in a position of obedi-
ence to the compulsory code of silence. Consequently, pressure will be
exerted upon them to remain mute if called to testify against their
partners in crime. 47 Because these witnesses have brought this coer-
cion upon themselves, the common-law exception to the duress de-
fense would preclude them from its utilization. 148
Witnesses seeking to use the duress defense would not always be
clearly identifiable as either an innocent witness or one who had
voluntarily associated himself with a criminal subculture. The exis-
tence of witnesses who fall somewhere between these extremes com-
plicates attempts to define the boundaries of the class of witnesses that
would be eligible for the defense. 14  Witnesses in this "middle
ground" should be excluded from the use of the duress defense when
the court finds, as a matter of law, that they negligently or recklessly
placed themselves in a position where it was probable that they would
be subjected to duress.
This determination could be approached through consideration of
various interrelated indicia of negligence. Significant factors would
146. See, e.g., United States v. Chinchic, 655 F.2d 547, 549 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Castleberry, 642 F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
3120 (1981); United States v. Spero, 625 F.2d 779, 780-81 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980); In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420, 421 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1151 (2d Cir. 1979); Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12,
13 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1977);
United States v. DiNapoli, 557 F.2d 962, 964-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 858
(1977); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 512, 513 (D. Del. 1981); Tully v. Scheu,
487 F. Supp. 404, 405 (D.N.J. 1980).
147. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
149. This "middle ground" class of witnesses would be extremely varied. It could
include: the noncriminal who places himself in a position where it is probable that he
will be privy to information that would incriminate organized crime figures, such as
long-time friends of organized criminals who continue their friendships after discov-
ery of the criminal connections; the offender whose relationship to organized crime is
either marginal or unknowing, such as the teenager who delivers a packet of nar-
cotics without being aware of the affiliations of the individual procuring his services;
and the purchaser of illegal services or products offered by organized crime, such as
the individual who places daily bets with a bookmaker.
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include: whether the witness has engaged in criminal activity,'0 the
nature of the witness's relationship to the defendant'' and the likeli-
hood of readily ascertaining the defendant's organized crime affilia-
tions.152  The establishment of precedents on a case-by-case basis
would gradually overcome the initial difficult , of utilizing a test to
determine whether a witness in the "middle ground" was eligible for
the duress defense.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DuREss DEFENSE
The intimidated witness seeking to utilize duress as a defense in a
federal contempt proceeding is faced with various obstacles to its
successful application. Of course, the elements of the defense would
have to be established. 5 3 Generally, when the duress occurs within
the context of an organized crime prosecution, there is little difficulty
in establishing that the threats were of death or serious bodily injury
and that a person of ordinary firmness would have been unable to
resist them. 1 These elements of the defense might be inferred from
150. The court might further ask: 1. Is the witness a codefendant or coconspirator
in the prosecution of the defendant? An affirmative answer would create a strong
presumption of negligence. 2. Is the witness's past criminal behavior similar to the
activities of organized crime? The likelihood of negligence would increase propor-
tionately to the similarity of the behavior. 3. Does his criminal behavior solely consist
of purchasing illegal products or services from organized crime? The likelihood of
negligence might be decreased when the witness's criminal behavior is not engaged in
for profit or is seldom prosecuted, such as placing illegal bets with a bookmaker.
151. Factors would include: 1. The duration of the relationship. The longer the
witness has known the defendant, the greater the likelihood of negligence. 2. The
purpose of the relationship. When the witness is merely a relative or long-time friend
who has never engaged in criminal activity, the likelihood of negligence might be
decreased. The existence of negligence might also be diminished when the witness is
an employee of the defendant, performing legitimate services such as gardening or
housekeeping. 3. What would have been the consequences had the witness termi-
nated the relationship upon learning of the defendant's organized crime affiliations?
The likelihood of negligence might decrease in proportion to the difficulty of termi-
nating the relationship. Such difficulty might arise in terms of creating family
problems, loss of employment or fear of reprisals.
152. The court might consider: 1. Whether the defendant is known to the public
as an organized crime figure. The likelihood of negligence would increase in propor-
tion to the public notoriety of the defendant as an organized crime figure. 2. Tile
relative ease of discovering the defendant's criminal affiliations, measured with
regard to the nature of the witness's relationship with the defendant. The likelihood
of negligence would decrease in situations when the defendant's occupation and life
style were not indicative of criminal activity. For example, negligence would de-
crease when the defendant had infiltrated legitimate business enterprises and did not
live visibly above the means of his professed occupation. Negligence in failing to
pierce the defendant's "cover" would increase in proportion to the intimacy and
duration of the witness's relationship with him.
153. See supra pt. I(A).
154. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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an offer to participate in the Witness Protection Program. Such an
offer signifies a determination by the Office of Enforcement Opera-
tions of the Department of Justice that "there is a clear indication that
the life of the witness is or will be in jeopardy." 5 5 More serious
obstacles to the application of the defense are the ramifications of
rejecting an opportunity to participate in the Witness Protection Pro-
gram, the vagaries of the immediacy requirement and the procedural
"Catch 22" of the duress defense.
A. The Witness Protection Program and the Innocent Witness
One requirement of the duress defense is that there must have been
no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law to avoid the
threatened danger. 56 Considering the extreme danger to threatened
witnesses in organized crime prosecutions,15 7 the Witness Protection
Program represents the only alternative to refusal to testify that might
adequately address the intimidated witness's need for protection. The
Fifth Circuit has explicitly held that even if the defense were avail-
able, the defendant had not brought himself within it where he had
declined to accept government protection from the asserted threats. 58
Similarly, in United States v. Patrick,5 9 the Seventh Circuit refused to
instruct the jury on the duress defense partially because Patrick made
no attempt to alleviate the danger his testimony might engender.10
Although the Witness Protection Program may successfully protect
the lives of its participants, it is not a reasonable alternative for the
innocent witness. In addition to the serious problems faced by all of its
participants,' 6 it must be stressed that the program lacks the capacity
to address the special needs of the noncriminal witness.102  Speaking
before a Senate Subcommittee in 1980, the Assistant Director for
Operations of the United States Marshals Service acknowledged that a
noncriminal witness entering the program would experience consider-
able trauma. 6 3 At the same hearing, Senator Sam Nunn character-
ized the honest witness as a challenge to the Marshals Service, but
indicated that the program was not designed for this class of wit-
155. 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 317 (statement of Gerald
Shur, Associate Director, Office of Enforcement Operations, Grim. Div., Dep't. of
Justice).
156. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
158. United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1979).
159. 542 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
160. Id. at 388.
161. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
162. 1980 Witness Security Hearings, supra note 14, at 255 (statement of Howard




ness. 164 At least until mechanisms for dealing with an innocent wit-
ness are developed and perfected, the Witness Protection Program
will remain an unreasonable alternative for the intimidated, innocent
witness.
Moreover, utilizing the threat of incarceration for contempt to
coerce the witness to testify and participate in the Witness Protection
Program is constitutionally suspect. Such coercion places an excessive
burden on his prerogative to retain all constitutional rights that he
does not voluntarily choose to relinquish. As previously stated, partici-
pation in the program requires the voluntary relinquishment of the
witness's rights of privacy and personal autonomy, freedom of associa-
tion, freedom of travel, and liberty.165
As a matter of basic constitutional principle, courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights. 66 Ordinarily, the courts require "an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" for a waiver to
be effective. 167  A waiver is not voluntary when it is induced by
threats that have a coercive, irresistible effect on the actor.'"6 For
example, parole agreements requiring the waiver of fourth amend-
ment rights as a prerequisite to early release from prison have been
struck down as unconstitutional. 69 In these cases, the only obstacle
between the prisoner and his liberty is the waiver of a constitutional
right. 7 0  The courts have found the threat of incarceration to be
sufficient coercion to invalidate the resulting waivers on the ground
that they were not voluntary in nature. '7
The dilemma of the intimidated witness in federal organized crime
prosecutions presents an analogous situation. By posing the threat of
contempt proceedings without the protection of the duress defense, all
that stands between the witness and the specter of incarceration is a
waiver of his constitutional rights. Requiring innocent witnesses to
participate in the Witness Protection Program or face incarceration
164. Id. (statement of Sen. Nunn).
165. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
166. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); see Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Hodges v. Easton,
106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
167. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), quoted in Brookhart %'. Janis,
384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
168. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); Marchibroda %'. United States, 368 U.S.
487, 493 (1962).
169. Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States cx rel.
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
170. See United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1156-57
(W.D.N.Y. 1975).
171. Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States ex rel.
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
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for contempt of court operates as a coercive threat, and thus cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
It may be argued that innocent witnesses would seldom be placed
in this dilemma in light of prosecutorial discretion17 2 and judicial
sensitivity. 173 Recognizing the excessive hardship that participation
in the Witness Protection Program would pose, such officials may be
reluctant to coerce the testimony of innocent witnesses. Nonetheless,
the preservation of the innocent witness's constitutional rights should
not depend on the equitable instincts of government officials when the
elements of a valid legal defense can be met.
B. The Immediacy Requirement Revisited
The immediacy requirement presents a much criticized, but contin-
uing obstacle to the application of the duress defense. 174 Considering
the availability of courtroom security, a recalcitrant witness would
have difficulty establishing that he was in immediate danger of death
or serious bodily harm at the moment he was put on the stand and
refused to testify. No case addressing the availability of the duress
defense, however, has urged the immediacy requirement to this outer
limit. This indicates that courts "would not lightly require a witness to
testify if [they were] convinced that death or serious bodily harm
would ensue therefrom." 175 In any event, courts should adopt the
rule applied in perjury cases that duress is sufficiently immediate if it
is acting upon the mind of the witness at the time of his criminal
behavior. 176
172. See National District Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards
125 (1977) (considering factors such as undue hardship to the accused, the mental
state of the defendant and mitigating circumstances in determining whether prosecu-
tion is justified); F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a
Crime 186 (1969) ("Obviously guilty persons may not be charged when, In the
judgment of police or prosecutor, the consequences of prosecution and conviction
seem unduly harmful in relation to the criminal conduct involved or the social and
economic circumstances of the suspect."). See generally Discretionary Authority of
the Prosecutor (J. Douglass ed. 1977).
173. See United States ex rel. Grand Jury Investigation v. Buonacure, 412 F.
Supp. 904, 907 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1826, plainly contem-
plates a relatively broad latitude in which a district judge may exercise his discretion
in deciding whether to incarcerate a recalcitrant witness."). Abuses of this discretion
can be corrected on appeal. See United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 780 (5th Cir.
1975) (reducing to two years a thirty-five-year sentence, to run consecutive to a
twelve-year state sentence, for refusal to testify based upon fear of reprisals).
174. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
175. Widger v. United States, 244 F.2d 103, 106 (5th Cir. 1957).
176. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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C. Untangling the "Catch 22" of the Duress Defense
In order to successfully utilize the duress defense, the witness must
first establish that threats were made against him." When the
threats are not anonymous178 and are made by the defendant in the
underlying criminal prosecution, the witness is placed in a position of
having to give testimony implicating the defendant in the offense of
tampering with a witness.' 79 Naturally, the witness may infer that
such testimony will give rise to the same reprisals he faced if he were
to testify in the original prosecution.
Moreover, to establish that threats have been made, the witness
might be required to give testimony establishing that he has incrimi-
nating information against the defendant in the original criminal
prosecution. Thus, in United States v. Cabrera,8 0 the district court
allowed cross-examination into the facts of the original prosecution
about which the contemnor had refused to testify.-8' The court
admittedly placed the contemnor in a "Catch 22" situation requiring
him to give "evidence adverse to the threateners; otherwise there
could be no basis for [his] fear." 82
177. United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1096 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); see United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1336
n.2 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); W. LaFave &
A. Scott, supra note 10, § 49 (1972). In the context of organized crime prosecutions, it
might be argued that duress is present, absent specific threats, by virtue of a "'fear
born of past mobster reprisals for cooperation with law enforcement agents." Gold-
stock & Coenen, supra note 1, at 207; see LaTona v. United States, 449 F.2d 121, 122
n.2 (8th Cir. 1971). Hundreds of cases against organized crime are lost because key
witnesses refuse to testify out of fear that they will suffer the same fate as witnesses
before them. See Invasions of Privacy, supra note 6, at 1157-58 (statement of Att'y
Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach). Former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzen-
bach described the horror engendered by organized crime as follows: "The face of
organized crime is not the face of the friendly corner bookie. It is the face of a man
beaten so systematically with a baseball bat that his face was swollen to more than
normal size before he reached the morgue. The face of organized crime is the face of
a man tortured, who was then shot and stuffed in a post hole. It is the face of the
young woman, throat cut ear to ear with a 6-inch slash running from neck to navel.
It is the face of the boys, aged 10 and 11, one of whom was killed and the other
maimed when a bomb exploded their automobile in Youngstown, Ohio. It is the face
of the man hung from a meathook in a freezer, then tortured, then burned alive." Id.
at 1157.
178. Naturally, when the threats are anonymous, the witness can testify as to
them without implicating the maker in the offense of tampering with a witness.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976); see, e.g., United States v. De Stefano, 476 F.2d 324,
326-27 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bradwell, 388 F.2d 619, 620 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968). The penalty for tampering with a government witness is
a fine of not more than $5,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or
both. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976).
180. 440 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd inein., 578 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1978).




The Fifth Circuit arrived at a suitable solution to this "Catch 22" in
the case of United States v. Gravel.183 The witness was cited for civil
contempt and a show cause hearing was held.184 At the hearing, the
witness was permitted to describe the threats he received in camera,
without any representative of the government present. 85 The testi-
mony was sealed,186 and thus the possibility of its being used at a
prosecution of the defendant was removed. 18 7
When the defense must be raised at a jury trial for criminal con-
tempt,188 however, its elements cannot be proven with the prosecution
and the jury excluded. The witness's dilemma might be alleviated, to
some extent, by a court ruling precluding the subsequent use of his
testimony at any criminal proceeding against the defendant. 189  The
witness, nonetheless, may well be justified in fearing reprisals for any
disclosure of incriminating evidence to which the prosecution is privy,
regardless of its inadmissibility in subsequent proceedings. 00
183. 605 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1979).
184. Id. at 751.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. The utilization of the in camera proceeding has been accepted in a number of
contexts, such as when sensitive governmental information, United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (confidential profiles of sociological and
psychological traits of airplane hijackers), or the safety of individuals required confi-
dentiality. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 565 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir.
1977) (release of identities of confidential informants to defense counsel), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975). At times, the safety needs of prospective
jurors come into conflict with the defendant's need for meaningful voir dire. For a
suggested use of in camera hearings to balance these needs, see A. Abromovsky, Juror
Safety: The Presumption of Innocence and Meaningful Voir Dire in Federal Crimi-
nal Prosecutions-Are They Endangered Species?, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 30, 58-60
(1981).
188. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (a jury trial must be
granted if the court imposes a sentence in excess of six months); Fed R. Crim. P. 42(b)
(a jury trial must be granted where an act of Congress so provides).
189. Cf. United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 751 (5th Cir. 1979) (testimony in
civil contempt hearing given in camera and sealed).
190. Out-of-court statements that are not sealed might be admitted at a criminal
trial of the defendant under several exceptions to the hearsay rule requiring the
unavailability of the declarant. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b). When the recalcitrant
witness "persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do so," he will generally be ruled an unavailable
witness. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(2); see United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1143
(4th Cir.) (holding unavailable a witness who, after being granted use immunity and
threatened with contempt, equivocated concerning willingness to answer), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir.
1976) (witness held unavailable when he refused to testify despite being granted use
immunity and receiving a six month sentence for contempt), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977). Once the witness is declared unavailable, his hearsay statements will be
admissible if the prosecutor can establish circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)-(5).
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The incidence of jury trials for criminal contempt might be substan-
tially reduced by the use of an in camera hearing prior to the court's
issuance of an order to testify.' 91 The purpose of the proceeding
would be to determine whether the elements of the duress defense
were present. No government representative would be permitted to
attend, and the testimony of the witness would be sealed.'9 2 It is
further suggested that, in all contexts, such an in camera proceeding
should be held prior to the time the witness's testimony is desired. This
practice would decrease the incidence of delays at the subsequent trial
or grand jury proceeding by providing a degree of certainty to guide
the expectations and consequent actions of both the witness and the
prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Efforts to eradicate organized crime are more likely to succeed if
the cooperation of the public at large can be marshalled. Improve-
ments in the Witness Protection Program are essential to procuring the
testimony of private citizens. At present, however, the program does
not represent a reasonable alternative for the intimidated, innocent
witness.
Notwithstanding the importance of bringing organized criminals to
justice, the courts will not tolerate the violation of fundamental indi-
vidual rights. This protection is extended to all citizens, regardless of
whether they are engaged in criminal activity. Thus, for example, the
target of an organized crime investigation will walk away in the face
of overwhelming evidence when he has been the victim of an illegal
search.
The preservation of the constitutional rights of an intimidated,
innocent witness is even more compelling. The innocent witness must
not be coerced to relinquish fundamental rights and participate in the
Witness Protection Program. He must not be denied the right to a
191. Criminal contempt for refusal to testify is available as a sanction only after
the recalcitrant witness has refused to obey a lawful court order to testify. 18 U.S.C.
§ 401(3) (1976). Thus, the grand jury can only return an indictment for criminal
contempt after a judge has ordered the witness to testify. Id., see, e.g., United States
v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States v. Leyva,
513 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1975). The judge may delay the issuance of an order to
testify pending the results of an in camera hearing to determine whether the elements
of the duress defense are met. Cf. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 565
F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1977) ("District courts have the inherent power to hold in
camera proceedings ...."), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978); United States v.
Hurse, 453 F.2d 128, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1971) (discussing the inherent power of courts
to hold in camera proceedings), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). Of course, if the
judge found the elements of the duress defense to be present, the order to testify
would not issue.
192. See United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 751 (5th Cir. 1979).
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defense long accepted at common law, which Congress has shown no
intention of abolishing through its legislative powers. Judicial frustra-
tion with the endless fight against organized crime must not be vented
against the innocent witness through the contempt powers of the
court. "When such sanctions are imposed on the victim-witness, they
result in punishing the wrong party; the wrath of the state falls on the
manipulated [contemnor] or perjurer, while the primary defendant
goes free.' 1 93
Stuart Mass
193. Goldstock & Coenan, supra note 1, at 229.
